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ISSUE
Does the Exclusion Clause in section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act
exclude the employment contracts
of all workers in interstate commerce from arbitration, or only the
contracts of workers who transport
goods in interstate commerce?

FACTS
Circuit City is a national retailer of
brand-name consumer electronics
and related products. In March
1995, the company implemented an
Associate Issue Resolution Program.
This program contained a number
of components, one of which was a
program of final and binding arbitration of all employment-related disputes pursuant to the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA). Those individuals who were employed at the
time the program was introduced
were given the opportunity to "opt
out" of the arbitration component of
the program. After implementation
of the program, all individuals seeking employment with Circuit City,
as part of the job application
process, were presented with the

Circuit City Dispute Resolution
Agreement (DRA). Any individual
who executed the DRA agreed to
resolve "any and all previously
unasserted claims, disputes or controversies arising out of or relating
to my application or candidacy for
employment, employment and/or
cessation of employment with
Circuit City, exclusively by final and
binding arbitration before a neutral
Arbitrator." Only those individuals
who signed the DRA and agreed to
be bound by its terms had their
application for employment considered by Circuit City. Any prospective applicant who executed the
DRA but then changed his mind
could withdraw from the agreement
to arbitrate by notifying Circuit City
that he was withdrawing his application for employment. The DRA provided that "neither this Agreement
nor the Dispute Resolution Rules
and Procedures form a contract of
employment between Circuit City
and me." The obligation to arbitrate
existed independently of the
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employment relationship and
applied before, during, and after the
employment relationship. The DRA
was a separate agreement between
the prospective applicant and
Circuit City.
Saint Clair Adams (respondent)
entered into an agreement with
Circuit City to arbitrate any and all
employment-related legal claims on
Oct. 23, 1995, when he executed
the DRA and submitted it with his
application for employment. Circuit
City signed the DRA. In November
1995, Adams was hired by Circuit
City as a sales counselor in Circuit
City's Santa Rosa store. Adams was
employed by Circuit City in that
capacity until he resigned his
employment on Nov. 30, 1996.
On Nov. 26, 1997, Adams sued
Circuit City in a California Superior
Court for a variety of employmentrelated claims-employment discrimination, state common law
wrongful discharge, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. On
Dec. 5, 1997, Adams also sought
arbitration, submitting to Circuit
City an Arbitration Request Form
that described the dispute he
wished to have decided by an arbitrator in the same terms as the
cause of action contained in his lawsuit. On Jan. 21, 1998, Adams filed
an amended complaint in his court
case incorporating a request for
declaratory relief with respect to his
rights and obligations under the
DRA. Specifically, Adams sought a
court order that the DRA was not
enforceable against him on various
legal grounds. In response, Circuit
City filed a Petition to Stay State
Court Action and to Compel
Arbitration in the United States
District Court for the Northern
District of California. On May 1,
1998, the District Court granted the
petition and entered an Order
Staying State Court Action and
Compelling Arbitration (unpub-

lished opinion). Respondent
appealed the District Court's Order
to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit held that the
Federal Arbitration Act was not
applicable to this case. 194 F.3d
1070 (9th Cir. 1999). The court
began its analysis by referencing its
recent decision in Craft v.
Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083
(9th Cir. 1999), in which the court
held that the exclusion found in section 1 of the FAA for "contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign and
interstate commerce" must be read
to exclude from the coverage of the
FAA all contracts of employment.
The Ninth Circuit also reasoned
that because the DRA was a condition precedent to Adams's employment, the DRA was part of the
employment contract. Therefore,
the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order compelling arbitration and remanded the case for
dismissal because of a lack of federal authority. Circuit City filed a
timely petition for a writ of certiorari. On May 22, 2000, the Supreme
Court granted Circuit City's petition. CircuitCity Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 120 S.Ct. 2004.
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit
to support a broad interpretation of
the exclusion clause that would
exclude all employment disputes
from FAA coverage. Eleven other
circuits have narrowly construed
the exclusion. See Dickstein v.
DuPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir.
1971) ("Courts have generally limited this exception to employees ...
involved in, or closely related to,
the actual movement of goods in
interstate commerce"); Erving v.
VA. Squires Basketball Club, 468
F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972) ("In
light of the strong national policy in
favor of arbitration as a means of

settling private disputes we see no
reason to give an expansive interpretation to the exclusionary language of [FAA] Section 1"); Great
W Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110
F.3d 222, 227 (3d Cir.) ("ITihe only
class of workers included within the
exception to the FAA's mandatory
arbitration provision are those
employed directly in the channels of
commerce itself"), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 915 (1997); O'Neil v. Hilton
Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274 (4th
Cir. 1997) ("The circuit courts have
informally reasoned that the strong
federal policy in favor of arbitration
requires a narrow reading of this
section 1 exemption"); Rojas v. TK
Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745,
748 (5th Cir. 1996) ("We agree with
the majority of other courts which
have addressed this issue and conclude that § 1 is to be given a narrow reading"); Asplundh Tree
Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592,
600-01 (6th Cir. 1995) ("We conclude that the exclusionary clause
of § 1 of the [FAA] should be narrowly construed to apply to employment contracts of seamen, railroad
workers and any other class of
workers actually engaged in the
movement of goods in interstate
commerce in the same way that
seamen and railroad workers are");
Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co.,
72 F.3d 50, 53 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995)
("[Tlhis exclusion is limited to
transportation workers ... ");
Pattersonv. Tenet Healthcare,
Inc.,113 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir.
1997) ("We are persuaded by the
reasoning of those circuits which
have held that section 1 applies
only to contracts of employment for
those classes of employees that are
engaged directly in the movement of
interstate commerce"); McWilliams
v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573, 576
(10th Cir. 1998) ("[Tlhe workers
engaged in interstate commerce
exclusion does not encompass all
employment contracts, just those of
(Continued on Page 78)
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employees actually engaged in the
channels of interstate commerce");
Paladinov. Avnet Computer Techs.,
134 F.3d 1054, 1060-61 (11th Cir.
1998) (per special concurrence of
Cox, Circuit Judge, for a majority of
the court) (narrow construction of
FAA § 1 exclusion "accords with the
statute's text and history"); Cole v.
Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d
1465, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
("[Sjection 1 of the FAA excludes
from the FAA only the employment
contracts of workers engaged in
the transportation of goods in
commerce").
CASE ANALYSIS
The Federal Arbitration Act was
originally enacted in 1925 and then
reenacted and codified in 1947 as
Title 9 of the United States Code. Its
purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at
English common law and had been
adopted by the American courts,
and to place arbitration agreements
upon the same footing as other
contracts.
Section 2 of the FAA is the scope
provision. It provides in relevant
part: "A written provision in any
maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction ...shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." 9
U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).
On the other hand, section 1 of the
FAA, which contains the statutory
definitions, states that "nothing
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C.
§ 1 (emphasis added). In other

words, section 2 validates arbitration clauses in contracts "involving
commerce," and section 1 excludes
from FAA coverage contracts of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers "engaged in"
foreign or interstate commerce. The
exclusionary language clearly eliminates from the potential reach of
the FAA all contracts of employment of seamen as a class and all
contracts of railroad employees as a
class. The issue in dispute is
whether the final phrase of the section 1 exclusion further eliminates
from the potential reach of the FAA
the employment contracts of all
other workers in interstate commerce, or only the contracts of
the limited subclass of workers
who transport goods in interstate
commerce.
Petitioner believes that the narrow
construction of section 1 is the correct construction. Petitioner argues
it is a fundamental proposition that
in a federal statute regulating interstate commerce, any words modifying the term "commerce" are critical to interpreting the precise scope
of the statute. Sections 1 and 2 of
the FAA each use a different modifier. Section 1 excludes only employment contracts of workers "engaged
in" interstate commerce. Section 2
includes within the coverage of the
FAA all transactions "involving commerce." The modifiers are obviously
different. Petitioner believes the
modifier in section 2's scope section
("involving" commerce) is broader
than the modifier in section l's
exclusion clause ("engaged in" commerce). Petitioner asserts that in
contrast to section 2's broad modifier, the section 1 qualifier "engaged
in" commerce, is ordinarily understood to signify some active and
direct involvement in the conduct of
interstate commerce. In common
usage, a worker is "engaged in"
interstate commerce when he is
actively employed in the actual

transporting of interstate commerce, and not simply when his job
might have some attenuated or passive connection to interstate commerce. In other words, the coverage
of the FAA should be broadly interpreted under section 2, and the
exclusion of coverage should be narrowly construed under section 1.
This "broad inclusion/narrow exclusion" approach is completely consistent with the federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements advanced by
the FAA.
Petitioner asserts the rule of ejusdem generis supports a narrow construction of section 1. The rule of
ejusdem generis provides that in
construing a statute, the meaning of
general terms that follow specific
ones should be limited to "matters
similar to those specified." The section 1 reference to contracts of
workers "engaged in" interstate
commerce does not stand alone. It
follows immediately upon the identification of two other specific types
of employment contracts excluded
from coverage-contracts of seamen
and contracts of railroad employees.
Seamen and railroad employees are
alike in that they are both a class of
workers "actually engaged in the
movement of interstate or foreign
commerce or in work so closely
related thereto as to be in practical
effect part of it." Taking a cue from
the specific mention of those two
classes of workers, the remaining
general category surely refers to
those "other workers" who also are
actually engaged in the movement
of goods in interstate commerce.
Petitioner asserts that the Ninth
Circuit's broad construction of the
exclusionary clause ignores the
well-established rule of statutory
construction that a court should
avoid a construction that renders
words in a statute surplusage. A
broad construction excludes all
employment contracts. It is argued
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that such a broad construction renders useless the statutory language
in section 1 of "seamen" and "railroad employees." The only way to
give meaning to all these termsseamen, railroad employees, and
other workers engaged in interstate
commerce-is by reference to what
all these have in common--direct
involvement in the interstate transportation of goods.

lated a liberal policy in favor of arbitration. This federal policy in favor
of arbitration should guide the
Court's resolution of interpretive
issues under the FAA. By reading
the FAA section 1 exclusion narrowly, the Court would be promoting a
broad application of the FAA.
Conversely, an expansive reading of
the section 1 exclusion would
remove from the scope of the FAA
nearly all arbitration agreements
between employers and employees.
The net effect would be a dramatic
reduction in the coverage of the
FAA. Clearly, a narrow construction
of the exclusionary clause is more
consistent with congressional intent
to favor arbitration in employeremployee disputes.

Despite respondent's assertions to
the contrary, petitioner believes
that the legislative history to section
l's exclusionary clause is scant and
murky. The bill that became the
FAA was drafted by the American
Bar Association's Committee on
Commerce, Trade and Commercial
Law. The original draft of the bill
did not contain the exclusion that
later became a part of section 1, and
very little official discussion of the
origin of the exclusion exists. The
best indication of the impetus for
the exclusion appears in a report of
the ABA Committee that indicates
that the exclusionary clause was
added to overcome the specific
objection of the seamen's union.
The legislative history does not
explain the expansion of the exclusionary clause to include railroad
workers or other workers engaged in
interstate commerce. Therefore,
petitioner concludes that the legislative history is not instructive, nor
supportive of a broad interpretation
of the exclusionary clause. In fact,
petitioner argues that the scant legislative history would support a narrow construction of section 1
because the genesis of the exclusion
was in response to a specific objection from a narrow class of workers
involved in the transportation of
goods in interstate commerce.

Finally, petitioner asserts that the
Ninth Circuit's broad construction
of the exclusionary clause cannot be
reconciled with 50 years of contrary
jurisprudence. In 1953, the Third
Circuit was the first circuit court to
analyze section l's exclusionary
clause. Tenney Engineering v.
United Elec. & Mach. Workers of
America, 207 F.2d 450 (3rd Cir.
1953). The Third Circuit held that
Congress intended to limit the FAA
section 1 exclusion to the two
groups of transportation workers as
to which special arbitration legislation already existed, and they
rounded out the exclusionary clause
by excluding all other similar classes of workers. Since 1953, 10 other
circuit courts have reached the
same conclusion that the exclusionary clause must be narrowly construed. The Ninth Circuit stands
alone in its broad construction of
the exclusionary clause and is contrary to the great weight of 50 years
of well-established authority.

Petitioner contends that a narrow
construction of the exclusionary
clause more aptly effectuates the
underlying purpose of the FAA. By
enacting the FAA, Congress articu-

Respondent believes the legislative
history is very useful in interpreting
the scope of the exclusionary
clause. Respondent asserts that a
review of the legislative history

clearly establishes that the FAA was
created to be a "commercial arbitration act," not an "industrial arbitration act." The sponsors of the FAA
(ABA Committee on Commerce,
Trade and Commercial Law) and
the members of Congress who spoke
and supported its passage stated
that it was a commercial arbitration
bill intended to deal with disputes
arising out of commercial transactions. The legislative history does
not contain a single reference suggesting that the FAA was intended
to cover employment disputes. In
fact, respondent indicates that labor
did object to the inclusion of workers' contracts in the FAA, which
precipitated the insertion of the section 1 exclusionary clause. Against
that background, respondent concludes that the only rational reading
of section 1 is that Congress intended to exclude all contracts of
employment from coverage.
Respondent also asserts that a broad
construction of the exclusionary
clause was specifically intended by
Congress's use of the term "engaged
in commerce." The statutory language identifies the class of excluded workers as those "engaged in
commerce." In its early-twentieth
century commerce clause cases, the
Supreme Court used the phrase
"persons engaged in commerce" to
describe the entire class of persons
constitutionally subject to the commerce power. See Second
Employers Liability Cases (Mondou
v. New York, N.H.R. Co.), 223 U.S.
(1912). Against that jurisprudential
background, in 1925 Congress was
accustomed to invoking its full commerce power through the statutory
term "engaged in commerce." For
example, the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, the Safety Appliance
Act, and several provisions of the
Clayton Act used the phrase
"engaged in" to identify broad classes of persons and companies cov(Continued on Page 80)

American Bar Association

ered by each statute. The FAA's section 1 exclusion is a contemporary
of those statutes. In 1925, the term
"engaged in" commerce was understood to state the full reach of the
commerce power with regard to
workers. Therefore, Congress's use
of that phrase in section 1 evidences its intent to exclude all
employment contracts that it could
constitutionally reach. A broad
reading of the exclusionary clause is
thus consistent with Congress's
intent.
From a historical context, respondent argues that a narrow reading of
section 1 cannot be squared with a
broad reading of section 2. First,
respondent notes that the phrase
"involving commerce" in section 2
was not a commerce clause term of
art in 1925, much less a term with
an established broad meaning. The
phrase "involving commerce" had
never been used in a commerce
clause provision prior to 1925 and
has never been used since. Also, the
term "involving commerce" is not
defined in the FAA to have any special meaning. In the common parlance of 1925, "involving" and
"engaged" were used as synonyms.
Dictionaries of the period defined
"engaged" as "involved" and defined
"engage" as to "involve oneself" or
to "become involved." Understood
in this historical context, Congress
thus used the term "involving commerce" to express the same commerce power reach as the term of
art "engaged in commerce."
Therefore, Sections 1 and 2 should
both be accorded a broad construction, not a broad/narrow construction as suggested by petitioner.
Respondent also contends that petitioner's construction-to broadly
construe section 2 and narrowly
construe section 1-is a paradox.
Petitioner's construction of the section 1 exclusion as being limited
only to transportation-of-goods-in-

commerce workers cannot be supported. First, respondent notes that
there is nothing in the legislative
record or in logic that would explain
why Congress would have singled
out only the employment contracts
of transportation-of-goods-in-commerce workers to be excluded.
Second, under petitioner's reading
of section 1, those employment contracts most involving interstate
commerce, and thus most assuredly
within the commerce clause power
in 1925 (viz., contracts of employees engaged in interstate transportation), are excluded from FAA coverage while those employment contracts having a less direct and less
certain connection to interstate
commerce would come within the
act's affirmative coverage. Limiting
coverage to those contracts least
evidently within the reach of the
federal constitutional authority justifying federal regulation is so anomalous that the Supreme Court
should not attribute such an intent
to Congress without the clearest
evidence.
Respondent argues that petitioner's
ejusdem generis argument is refuted
by the express language of the
exclusionary clause. The exclusionary clause references "any other
class of workers." This language is a
term of breadth, not a term of limitation. The respondent asserts that
when Congress uses the phrase "any
other" to describe a residual category, it does so to indicate that the
category stands on its own, unlimited by reference to prior statutory
terms. See Harrisonv. PPG
Industries,Inc., 446 U.S. 578
(1980). Therefore, in the absence of
legislative history to the contrary,
the phrase "any other" in the exclusionary clause must be construed to
mean broadly what it says-"any
other." Any attempt to limit the
breadth of the specific language by
an ejusdem generis argument

directly contradicts the express
statutory language.
Finally, the respondent contends
that this case is as much about federalism and the states' power to regulate workers' contracts as it is
about the enforceability of employment arbitration provisions.
Regulation of the individual employer-employee relationship has long
been the province of the states.
Generally, Congress is not presumed
to have intended to displace state
law, absent a clear statement to the
contrary. Similarly, the Supreme
Court starts with the assumption
that the historic police power of the
states is not to be superseded absent
a clear mandate from Congress. A
statutory construction that Congress
preserved the states' authority to
regulate individual employment contracts will allow the states to decide
issues of enforceability and procedure under their own laws pursuant
to their own policies. An expansive
interpretation of the exclusionary
clause will preserve the states' traditional role in resolving employeremployee disputes.
Numerous amicus briefs were filed
in this case. Those briefs in support
of the petitioner offer a number of
policy reasons to support a narrow
construction of the exclusionary
clause. First, they argue that the use
of arbitration has become firmly
entrenched in our country's workplace culture and should be encouraged. Second, multistate employers
need uniform policies that would be
available under the FAA. State arbitration laws are not uniform and
vary dramatically from state to
state. Third, a broad construction of
the exclusionary clause would add
thousands of employer-employee
disputes to an already clogged and
overburdened court system. The
applicable axiom is "Justice delayed
is Justice denied." And finally, it is
in the best interest of employees,
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employers, and society to resolve
employer-employee disputes in an
expeditious, fair, and cost-effective
process. It has been estimated that
arbitration results in a 50 percent
cost saving for the parties and that
the average arbitration involves 8.6
months as compared to 3-5 years in
court.
Similarly, the amicus briefs in support of the respondent offer a number of policy reasons to support a
broad construction of section l's
exclusion. They argue that employers use arbitration to cause employees to forgo substantive rights.
Where the equality of bargaining
power in the employer-employee
relationship is totally lacking,
employers often include unfair or
oppressive provisions in the arbitration agreement that penalize the
employee. The employee may first
be required to litigate the unfair or
oppressive arbitration clause and
then address the merits of the
employee's claim. The net effect is
to place the employee at a considerable disadvantage in obtaining a fair
resolution to his claim. Also, they
assert that the states should not be
divested of their traditional role as
the principal protector of the rights
of workers. Absent a clear congressional intent to preempt, one established principle of federalism is to
disfavor the displacement of traditional areas of state law, such as
employment.
SIGNIFICANCE
The expanding use of arbitration to
resolve conflicts has had a dramatic
impact on dispute resolution in the
United States. Arbitration is understood to be a much faster and less
expensive process for resolving disputes than litigation in the courts. It
has been estimated that on average
arbitration is one-half the cost and
takes one-quarter the time to proceed through trial. In addition,
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another significant advantage of
arbitration is that appeals are relatively rare.
The employer-employee relationship
is one of the cornerstones of our
country. Numerous disputes arise in
the employment relationship. A few
examples are wrongful discharge,
claims of discrimination, and issues
of contract interpretation. Many
employers have selected arbitration
under the FAA as the preferred
mechanism to resolve these workplace disputes. Section 1 of the FAA,
however, contains an exclusion
clause that excludes certain specified contracts from FAA coverage. A
broad interpretation of the clause
will exclude disputes arising from all
employment cofitracts from arbitration under the FAA. Claimants/
employees would, therefore, be free
to pursue their employment-related
claims in state court. A narrow
interpretation of the clause would
exclude only a small class of workers in interstate commerce from
coverage under the FAA. The vast
majority of employer-employee disputes would continue to be eligible
for arbitration under the FAA. The
dynamics of dispute resolution
between employers and employees
may be vastly altered by the
Supreme Court's decision.
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